Good vs Expedient

And on Themistocles telling the people in assembly that he had some advice for them, which could not be given in public, but was most important for the advantage and security of the city, they appointed Aristides alone to hear and consider it with him. And on his acquainting Aristides that his intent was to set fire to the arsenal of the Greeks, for by that means should the Athenians become supreme masters of all Greece, Aristides, returning to the assembly, told them that nothing was more advantageous than what Themistocles designed, and nothing more unjust. The Athenians, hearing this, gave Themistocles order to desist; such was the love of justice felt by the people, and such the credit and confidence they reposed in Aristides. -- Plutarch, Aristides

Expedient: "Convenient and practical, although possibly improper or immoral."

Good: "That which is morally right; righteousness."

It is expedient to defend your interests abroad, torture to obtain information, arrest terrorist suspects without trial or habeas corpus based on mere suspicion, etc. 

It is good to treat others as you would want them to treat you.

If someone tries to kill you, it is expedient to defend yourself.  But is it good?  Consider the anti-Lehi-Nephis, and D&C 98:23-24.

It is good to not kill, but is it sometimes expedient?  Consider Nephi and Laban, and the Israelite invasion of the promised land.

Can a balance be achieved?

Consider the ideal, not just the best case scenario, but the best of possible worlds.  Use this as a model.  We may never reach it, but having our eye on the goal will keep us going in the right direction.

With the ideal in mind, consider what expedients are necessary in the current situation.  Are they really expedient at all?  Will they move us any closer to the ideal, are are they merely compromising our integrity?

Cicero, De Officiis, book 3

is all about the Good vs the Expedient.  Cicero states that "if anything is morally right, it is expedient, and if anything is not morally right, it is not expedient."  All conflict between the two is specious. "There can be no expediency where there is immorality."

He examines some possible exceptions.  "For it often happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong."  For example, killing a tyrant is considered good even though killing is bad.  (I'm not sure Christians would always agree with Cicero here, although we must consider Nephi and Laban.)

He also makes some exceptions to stealing, etc, if it accomplishes a great good for the nation or the people in general. "These cases are very easy to decide. For, if merely, for one's own benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary to Nature's law. But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to render signal service to the state and to human society — if from that motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter for censure."

(Note: Cicero equates "Nature's Laws" with "the common rule of equity", another confirmation of the reciprocity principle.)

"This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical."  (Seems like he drifted to the law of love with this sentiment.)  He also says we owe more to our family than to our nation than to foreigners.

Another specious exception: "Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly upright to seize upon something that seems to be expedient and straightway to dissociate that from the question of moral right."  We can see this a lot today, when the question of moral rightness never even enters into the discussion.  But he says, "Those actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere consideration of which is itself morally wrong."

He considers the story of the man with a ring of invisibility.  What would be do if we could do anything with impunity?  He clears away the difficulty by considering the character of people who have difficulty with such a question: "We put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their selfish interest, that would be a confession that they are criminally minded; should they say that they would not do so they would be granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided." And later: "For how few will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if assured of the power to keep it an absolute secret and to run no risk of punishment!" (No accountability inevitably leads to corruption. e.g. secret spying)

Next, he considers questions of "whether the apparent advantage can be secured without moral wrong."  He affirms the Natural Law (of Locke and others): "each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his neighbour's."

He considers the obligations of friendship. "It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is short and easy to master: apparent advantages — political preferment, riches, sensual pleasures, and the like — should never be preferred to the obligations of friendship."  "Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will prefer his friend's side to be the juster one."  "For supposing that we were bound to everything that our friends desired, such relations would have to be accounted not friendships but conspiracies."

He makes an insightful comment on immigration: "They, too, do wrong who would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and would exclude them from its borders...  It may not be right, of course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and privileges of citizenship; ...  Still, to debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the laws of humanity."

He considers several cases of withholding information and whether it is right or wrong, and concludes, "Concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person would be guilty of it?" "Now reason demands that nothing be done with unfairness, with false pretence, or with misrepresentation."

He considers the saying, "In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself."

Another observation: "Is it not a shame that philosophers should be in doubt about moral questions on which even peasants have no doubts at all?"

"For all cases we have one rule, with which I desire you to be perfectly familiar: that which seems expedient must not be morally wrong; or, if it is morally wrong, it must not seem expedient."

"For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable."

No Win Situations

I think an important case which Cicero fails to consider is no-win situations, when there is (apparently) no moral course left available.  For example, is it better for one man to die or for an entire nation to dwindle in unbelief? 

Many of these questions are artificial and hypothetical, designed to leave no escape.  A real answer would require serious outside-the-box thinking, or simply refusing to take either alternative. 

Sometimes they arise in real life too, such as every presidential election.  As long as we choose the lesser of two evils, we will always have evil leaders.

D&C 98

Here are some profound revelations on this subject.

4-10 on the constitution and laws.  "I, the Lord God, make you free, therefore ye are free indeed; and the law also maketh you free."

16-17 "Therefore, renounce war and proclaim peace, and seek diligently to turn the hearts of the children to their fathers, and the hearts of the fathers to the children; And again, the hearts of the Jews unto the prophets, and the prophets unto the Jews;"

And especially 23ff on the Lord's laws of vengeance.

If men will smite you, or your families, once, and ye bear it patiently and revile not against them, neither seek revenge, ye shall be rewarded; But if ye bear it not patiently, it shall be accounted unto you as being meted out as a just measure unto you.

If your enemy shall smite you the second time, and you revile not against your enemy, and bear it patiently, your reward shall be an hundred fold.

If he shall smite you the third time, and ye bear it patiently, your reward shall be doubled unto you four-fold; (doubled four times = 2⁴ = 16 × the above 100)

if that enemy shall escape my(not yours) vengeance, that he be not brought into judgment before me, then ye shall see to it that ye warn him in my name, that he come no more upon you

if he shall come upon you, I have delivered thine enemy into thine hands; And then if thou wilt spare him, thou shalt be rewarded for thy righteousness; and also thy children and thy children’s children unto the third and fourth generation.

Nevertheless, thine enemy is in thine hands; and if thou rewardest him according to his works thou art justified

Behold, this is the law I gave unto my servant Nephi (Laban wronged him at least three times, trying to kill him or Laman twice and stealing their gold.)

34-36 the same law applies to relations between nations.

Past offenses? "But if the children shall repent, or the children’s children, and turn to the Lord their God, with all their hearts and with all their might, mind, and strength, and restore four-fold for all their trespasses wherewith they have trespassed, or wherewith their fathers have trespassed, or their fathers’ fathers, then thine indignation shall be turned away;"